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Searching for the Perfect Solution:
International Dispute Resolution and the
New World Trade Organization
By AzAR M. KHAsAPi":
I. Introduction
In the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations
(the "Final Act"),1 Contracting Parties2 to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)3 implemented substantial reforms to the
current system of international trade regulation. Perhaps the most sig-
nificant of these reforms is the adoption of the Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization (WTO). 4 The WTO system differs
from the GATT system in several ways, including the creation of a
single dispute resolution processI the installation of an appellate
body,6 and the mandate that all disputes submitted for settlement
shall be decided by consensus. 7 Such changes in policy reflect the
growing concern that international trade resolutions are ineffective,
self-serving,8 and attempt to "level and order the playing field of inter-
national trade between states."
9
* Member of the Class of 1997. B.A. University of California, San Diego, 1993. The
author wishes to thank her family for their endless support and encouragement, and
Sharmila Lodhia for all her help in preparing this Note.
1. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143 [hereinafter Final Act].
2. For a list of Contracting Parties, see id. at 1131 (introductory pages of Final Act).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 194 [hereinafter GATr].
4. Final Act art. I.
5. Final Act Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Dispute, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding].
6. Id. art. 17, para. 1.
7. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
8. See generally G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Thory:
An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DuKE Li. 829,833-37 (1995) (discussing
the move towards trade legalism and the philosophy supporting such a move).
9. Id. at 836.
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Just how effective the WTO will be in actually serving the needs
of Contracting Parties has yet to be seen.1" This Note suggests that
the changes implemented by the Final Act will do little to improve
international dispute settlements. Part I examines GATT's dispute
settlement procedure and highlights the flaws that served as the impe-
tus to the creation of a new dispute settlement procedure. Part II ex-
plains the development and structure of the WTO. Part III examines
this new procedure through an analysis of dispute settlement under
the Final Act. Part IV applies the new dispute resolution procedure
to the banana trade debate to demonstrate that, while the Final Act
was effective in calling attention to the need for change in the interna-
tional dispute settlement arena, little change has actually taken place.
Finally, this Note concludes that international dispute settlements are
the result of political maneuvering rather than a genuine concern for
improving the conditions of international trade.
H. GATT Dispute Settlement
A. Early Application of GATT to International Trade Disputes
From its inception GAIT was destined to fail in its endeavor to
regulate trade disputes.1 GATT was initially established as a multi-
lateral treaty operating under the umbrella of what was to be the In-
ternational Trade Organization (ITO) charter. 2 When the ITO failed
to come into being, GATT, by default, became the organization
through which international trade was conducted.' 3 However, be-
cause the original design of GATT had been for the limited purpose
of tariff reduction, it was ill-equipped to handle the broader task of
regulating world trade relations. 4
GATT's inadequacy as the international institute of trade is most
evident in its institutional framework and, in particular, in its dispute
10. Thomas J. Dillon, Jr., The World Trade Organization: A New Legal Order for
World Trade?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 349, 395-96 (1995).
11. See generally John H. Jackson, Managing the Trading System: The World Trade
Organization and the Post-Uruguay Round GATT Agenda, in MANAGINO THE WORLD
ECONOMY Fn'Ty YEARS AFTER BRETrON WooDs 131 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994).
12. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNA.
TIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 33 (1989).
13. Id. at 37.
14. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON & WiLLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATnONS 293-324 (1986) (discussing GATT's troubled
origins).
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resolution mechanisms.' 5 Under GATT's system of dispute settle-
ment, parties filing a complaint would first go through consultation
and negotiation to solve the dispute.'6 If no solution was reached, the
chairman of the GATT Council would select a panel to hear the dis-
pute.17 This panel would then be responsible for taking evidence,
hearing arguments, and submitting a written decision to the GAIT
Council for adoption.ls For adoption to occur, all GATT Council
Contracting Parties had to vote in favor of adoption., Such a system
enabled a single vote, including the vote of the party that lost the case,
to block approval of a panel's decision and prevent it from becoming
substantive law.20 The result was decreased confidence in GATT's
ability to provide even-handed justice in the international trade dis-
pute arena.2'
B. Difficulties Encountered with GATT's Dispute
Resolution Process
The lack of confidence in GATT led to a weak application of
GATT to national law, thus making its role in the international com-
munity minimal.2 In particular, the procedural flaws in GATT's dis-
pute settlement mechanism left many GATT Contracting Parties
frustrated and disillusioned by international dispute resolutions.- As
John H. Jackson notes, there was a general "lack of appropriate coor-
dination and discussion between officials of national governments and
international organizations who concentrated on monetary and lend-
ing questions, on the one hand, and those involved in the somewhat
15. In its first draft, GATT devoted only two articles to dispute resolution. Article
XXII consisted of one paragraph and Article XXIII consisted of three. See GATT arts.
XXII, XXIII. Only two of these paragraphs discussed dispute resolution procedure. Id.
In contrast, the WTO provides 27 articles on dispute procedure alone. See generally Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding.
16. GATI art. XXII.
17. See generally Rosine Plank, An Unofficial Description of how a GATT Panel
Works and Does Not, J. INT'L ARB., December 1987, at 53.
is. IC.
19. Id. at 88.
20. Shell, supra note 8, at 842.
21. See, eg., Uruguay Round Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Comm.,
103d Cong. 2nd Sess. 195 (March 23, 1994) (testimony of John H. Jackson, Hess-l E.
Yntema Professor of Law University of Michigan).
22. See, eg., Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lavyers
Triumph over Diplomats, 29 INT'L LAw. 3S9, 394 (1995).
23. Kendall W. Stiles, The New IVTO Regime: The Victory of Pragmatism, 4 J. IN 'L L.
& PRAc. 3, 8 (1995).
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'messier' problems of trade in goods, on the other. ' 'Z4 Procedural
problems included the use of too many competing codes to resolve
disputes,2 the ability to "panel shop" to get a desired result rather
than use of a set and impartial panel,26 and the lack of legal experts on
GATT panels.27
Ambiguity and inconsistency in panel decisions, and delays in the
implementation of panel decisions, also constituted a serious impedi-
ment to the effective functioning of the dispute settlement system.
28
The result was a dispute resolution mechanism offering no reliable
body of case law.29 As Kendall W. Stiles points out, under the old
system "panels seemed to be reinventing the wheel and would-be dis-
putants never knew what to expect.""0 By 1994, compliance with
GATE panel decisions was less than sixty percent.31 Such a lack of
compliance served to undermine the authority of GATT, making it no
more than a facade of regulation in the international arena. One critic
contends that "GAT has been reduced from a legalistic instrument,
designed to secure an open trading system, to a document that in re-
spect of some important rules acts only to exhort governments not to
intervene in international trade."'32
M. World Trade Organization
A. Creating a New World Order in International Trade
GATT's weaknesses can be linked to the lack of consensus
among Contracting Parties on what GATT's norms are, or should
be.3" That is, in its early years, GATT experienced success because of
the "homogeneity of the initial Contracting Parties and the consensus
in support of the GAT rules. '34 As GATE grew, the consensus
24. Jackson, supra note 11, at 142.
25. Stiles, supra note 23, at 7.
26. Id. at 8.
27. Robert E. Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of the
DISC Case, 72 MnrN. L. REv. 1443, 1508 (1988).
28. John Weeks, Procedures for Dispute Settlement Under the World Trade Organiza-
tion-GATT 1994 and Under Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trede Agreement, 18
HAMLINE L. REV. 343, 343 (1995).
29. Stiles, supra note 23, at 9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. C.F. Teese, A View from the Dress Circle in the Theatre of Trade Disputes, 5
WORLD ECON. 43, 51 (1982).
33. Miquel Montana i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins over Politics in the Reso-
lution of International Trade Disputes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 10., 127 (1993).
34. Id. at 108.
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weakened and tensions surrounding the development of more com-
plex and expansive rules began to build.-' In the case of dispute set-
tlement, differing philosophies on the function and purpose of GATT
led to inconsistent panel decisions and a growing unwillingness among
Contracting Parties to comply with GATr decisions.2 '
The differing understandings of GATT's position in international
law can be divided into two approaches: the legalist approach and the
pragmatist approach.37 Under the legalist approach, "GATT is law
and international obligation."3s Legalism focuses on the need for
rules and a strict compliance with those rules.39 Under the pragmatist
approach, GATT is a forum for negotiation and compromise.4u As
one pragmatist states, in reference to GAIT, "The compromises may
not always be technically in accordance with the 'law' as a court would
apply it, but most problems have in fact been diffused, and the overall
system has held together.. ."41 Unlike legalists, pragmatists focus on
resolving conflict or diffusing problems, rather than on following rules
per se.42
It has been argued that GATT followed the pragmatist approach
by focusing on diplomacy and voluntary compliance.43 Legalists claim
that such practices turned GAT law into "soft" law4 and ultimately
caused its erosion. According to legalists, a tough, rule-oriented
GATT would provide more certainty, more predictability, and fairer
treatment.45 The WTO, as the heir to GAT, can be seen as an at-
tempt to shift international legal mechanisms from a pragmatist ap-
proach to a legalist approach.46
35. Id.
36. Stiles, supra note 23, at 10.
37. Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 109.
38. Id.
39. For a more complete discussion of legalism, see generally Shell, supra note 8.
40. Phillip R Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Laiv," 83 MicH. L. REv.
1016, 1017 (1985).
41. Id.
42. For a good defense of the pragmatist approach, see generally OLivian Lo.o, L:,
AND ITs LIMrrATIONS IN THE GATI MULTILATERAL TRADE S'Y.Mi (1967).
43. Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 110.
44. "Soft" law is distinguished by a certain vagueness in the obligation it imposes and
is generally not binding on Contracting Parties. See, eg., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Lawv
and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MicH. J. IN 'L L. 420. 420 (19)1l.
45. John FL Jackson, Perspectives on the Jurisprudence of International Trade' Costs
and Benefits of Legal Procedures in the United States, 82 MicH. L. RE'v. 1570, 1571-72
(1984).
46. See Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 106.
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B. The WTO Agreement
The WTO was specifically designed to fill GATT's many organi-
zational and procedural shortcomings.47 Essentially, the WTO Agree-
ment is a charter limited to setting up the institutional and procedural
structure that will facilitate effective implementation of the substan-
tive rules negotiated in the Uruguay Round. It is intended to be
guided by GAIT decisions, procedures, and customary practices.43
By replacing GATT, the WTO is to be the authority on world
trade relations, negotiations, and dispute resolutions.49 The functions
of the WTO are as follows: to facilitate the implementation, adminis-
tration, and operation of the Covered Agreements; 50 to provide a fo-
rum for negotiations between Contracting Parties;51 to settle disputes
arising under the Covered Agreements;52 to administer the Trade Pol-
icy Review Mechanism;5 3 and to cooperate with the International
Monetary Fund and World Bank for the purpose of achieving "greater
coherence in global economic policy-making.
''5 4
The WTO consists primarily of the Ministerial Conference, 5  the
General Council,56 and the Secretariat. The Ministerial Conference
carries out the functions of the WTO and has the authority to make
decisions on matters derived from the Covered Agreements."8 The
Ministerial Conference is formed by representatives of all Contracting
Parties of the WTO and meets once every two years.5 9 The General
Council is responsible for the functions of the WTO when the Ministe-
rial Conference is not in session.60 Like the Ministerial Conference,
the General Council includes representatives from all Contracting
Parties of the WTO.6' Unlike the Ministerial Conference, however,
the General Council meets only on an "as needed" basis. '52 The Secre-
47. See Dillon, supra note 10, at 351.
48. Jackson, supra note 11, at 135.
49. Dillon, supra note 10, at 361.
50. Final Act art. III, para. 1.
51. Id para. 2.
52. Id. para. 3.
53. Id para. 4.
54. Id para. 5.
55. hd art. IV, para. 1.
56. Id. para. 2.
57. Id. art. VI, para. 1.
58. Id. art. IV, para. 1.
59. Id.
60. Id para. 2.
61. Id.
62. Id. para. 4.
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tariat consists of a Director-General and staff.63 The Ministerial con-
ference appoints the Director-General and adopts regulations
defining the Director-General's powers, duties, conditions of service,
and term.64
C. Possible Effects of the WTO Agreement on International Trade
The WTO was established to "fix" the many ills created by
GATr.65 GATT's inability to create a coherent body of law was espe-
cially frustrating for the Contracting Parties. Weaknesses in GATE's
dispute settlement mechanism highlighted GAT's overall ineffective-
ness in governing international trade.66 Procedural problems, incon-
sistencies in panel decisions, and a lack of compliance with GATT law
left the international community in want of a regulatory mechanism
that could actually regulate.67
The effectiveness of the NWTO in serving the needs of participat-
ing countries has yet to be seen. One scholar notes, however, that
international law has always been, and vill always be, the result of
political maneuvering rather than the product of genuine concern for
improving international trade conditions.6s Ultimately, the need for
peace and cooperation among nations will lead to compromises. Such
compromises will serve to undermine the consistency and reliability
that international law needs. An analysis of the dispute settlement
mechanisms under the VTO shows that, while the WTO establishes a
more rule-oriented regime, it still lacks the power to insist on
mandatory compliance with those rules.69 As a result, the Contracting
Parties inevitably will not follow the rules.70 Thus, while the ,ITO
establishes more demanding implementation policies, less developed
nations will still face difficulty, if not fail completely, in forcing devel-
oped nations to bring measures that violate international trade rules
into conformity.7'
63. Id. art. VL paras. 2-3.
64. Id. para. 2.
65. Dillon, supra note 10, at 355.
66. Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 118-21.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 113.
69. Dillon, supra note 10, at 398.
70. Id. at 400.
71. Id.
1996]
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IV. Dispute Settlement Under the WTO Agreement
A. Changes From GAYT
Perhaps the most significant development to corae out of the
WTO Agreement is the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).72
Through the DSU, three main improvements have been made to the
system. First, the DSU establishes an integrated dispute settlement
system by specifying that the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes Under Articles XXII and XX-
III of GAIT is to be the exclusive source of procedure to resolve
GATT disputes.73 Such a unified system overcomes the problem of
uncertainty in determining which procedure to apply.74
Second, the DSU creates an Appellate Body to review legal is-
sues decided by panels. 75 The Appellate Body is composed of seven
Contracting Parties who are appointed by the Dispute Settlement
Body (DSB) to serve four year terms.76 Appeals are limited to issues
of law covered in panel reports and legal interpretations developed by
the panel.77 In an attempt to reduce delay in panel decision imple-
mentation, appellate proceedings are not to exceed sb:ty days.78 In
addition, Appellate Body decisions are to be adopted by the DSB un-
less the DSB decides by consensus 79 not to adopt the decision within
thirty days of its issuance."0
Finally, the DSU implements a policy of adopting panel decisions
unless there is a reverse consensus.8 ' Under GATT, the GAIT Coun-
cil had to approve unanimously a panel report before a ruling could
be made.82 However, under the DSU, the functions o' the General
Council and the Committees are governed by the DSB.83 The DSB, in
turn, automatically adopts a panel report unless there is a unanimous
72. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 3, para. 3.
73. Id. art. 1, para. 1.
74. For a more detailed analysis of procedure under the WTO Agrcement, see Mon-
tana i Mora, supra note 33, at 143.
75. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 17, para. 1.
76. Id para. 2.
77. 1d para. 6.
78. Id. para. 5.
79. For a definition of "consensus" under the Dispute Settlement Understanding, see
id. art. 2, para. 4.
80. Id art. 17, para. 14.
81. Id. art. 16, para. 4.
82. See Plank, supra note 17, at 88.
83. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 2, para. 1.
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vote to reject the report.' This form of reverse consensus gives panel
decisions much more meaning and effect by presuming that decisions
are substantive law until affirmative actions are taken to establish
otherwise. By making panel decisions valid law at the moment of in-
ception, the DSU seeks to eliminate much of the delay and subse-
quent lack of compliance associated with GATT's dispute settlement
mechanism.
B. Dispute Resolution Phases
Some scholars argue that the WTO's new dispute resolution
mechanism reflects an attempt to move international law towards a
legalist approachSS Under GATT, dispute resolutions catered pri-
marily to diplomacy by following a policy of party concession and leni-
ent enforcement., 6 The WTO's mechanism, on the other hand,
invokes a system of codes and strict enforcement s 7 Such a system is
designed to provide more dependable enforcement, add pressure to-
wards compliance, reduce costs, and inspire more confidence in trade
rules.-s
The WTO dispute resolution mechanism can be divided into four
main phases: consultation,89 a panel phase,9° Appellate Body review,'" I
and, as an optional alternative procedure, arbitration.92 Before bring-
ing a case, Contracting Parties are to consider the likelihood of suc-
cess through such action.93 Consultation, as a means through which
Contracting Parties can gain some sense of the strengths and weak-
nesses of their case, plays a significant role in dispute settlement. 4 To
ensure that consultation is used and taken seriously the DSU specifi-
cally states that "[e]ach Contracting Party undertakes to accord sym-
pathetic consideration to and afford adequate opportunity for
consultation regarding any representations made by another Con-
tracting Party concerning measures affecting the operation of any cov-
84. Id art. 16, para. 4.
85. See Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 176-SO.
86. See Shell, supra note 8, at 840-41 (discussing the evolution of GATIs dispute reso-
lution system from diplomatic dispute settlement to a system of nonbinding arbitration).
87. Id. at 852.
88. Id at 895.
89. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 4.
90. Id. arL 12.
91. Id art. 17.
92. Id. art. 25.
93. Id art. 3, para. 7.
94. See Dillon, supra note 10, at 381.
19961
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ered agreement taken within the territory of the former."95 During
the consultation phase, Contracting Parties are charged with attempt-
ing to "obtain satisfactory adjustment of the matter" in confidential
negotiations within sixty days.9 6
If the disputing Contracting Parties are unable to settle their dif-
ferences within the sixty day period, the complaining party may re-
quest a panel. 97 Panels are composed of three, or, if agreed to within
ten days of panel establishment, five "well-qualified governmental
and/or non-governmental individuals."98 Such a requirement is indic-
ative of an attempt to enhance the quality and authority of panel re-
ports.99 Furthermore, panel Contracting Parties are to be selected
"with a view to ensuring the independence of the Contracting Parties
[of the panel]."'1 Therefore, impartiality is maintained by excluding
the disputing parties from participating on the panel hearing their
case.'
0 '
Panel nominations are made by the Secretariat, and the parties
may not oppose the nomination without "compelling reasons."' 02
Parties must agree on the panelists within twenty days of the establish-
ment of the panel.'0 3 If they cannot agree, the Director-General, in
consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and Chairman of a rele-
vant council or committee of a covered agreement, shall appoint the
panelists. °4 Such codification of the panel selection process repre-
sents a victory for those favoring a legalist approach to international
dispute resolution. By presuming the authority of parel nominees,
and by enforcing strict time limits on opposition to the nominees, the
DSU moves international law towards a more rule-oriented system.
Such a system seeks to eliminate the delay and noncompliance that
plagued GATI"s dispute resolution system.
The decision-making process under the DSU is also marked by
legalistic underpinnings. Under the new system, panels conduct confi-
dential deliberations,0 set deadlines,0 6 receive submissions and re-
95. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 4, para. 2.
96. 1& paras. 5-7.
97. Id. para. 3.
98. Id. art. 8, para. 1.
99. See Dillon, supra note 10, at 384.
100. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 8, para. 2.
101. Dillon, supra note 10, at 384.
102. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 8, para. 6.
103. Id. para. 7.
104. Id.
105. Id art. 14, para. 1.
106. Id art. 12, para. 5.
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buttals, °7 and consider oral argumentslQs Panels may also request
information from any appropriate body or source, including experts,
and acquire confidential information from administrative bodies in
the Contracting Party's nation.10 9 After discovery and deliberation,
panels must submit a written report to the DSB." 0 The entire panel
phase, from panel creation to report submission, should take no more
than six months."' While exceptions can be made to the six month
deadline, the DSU strongly disfavors proceedings that take longer
than nine months." 2
Once the panel report is submitted to the DSB, the report will be
adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the report or
unless one of the parties requests an appeal.13 The Appellate Body,
like courts of appeal in the United States, is limited to determinations
of questions of law and legal interpretation." ' Those sitting on the
Appellate Body act as judges and are "persons of recognized author-
ity, with demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and the
subject matter of the covered agreements generally.""15 Appellate
Body proceedings are confidential,116 and the opinions submitted by
the Body Contracting Parties are anonymous.117 Unlike the panel
phase, here the disputing parties have no role in choosing Body Con-
tracting Parties. Instead, Body "judges" are assigned to cases in rota-
tions of threel's through a schedule created by the Body itself in
consultation with the DSB Chairman and the Director-General."
19
Deliberations of the Appellate Body must be completed and a
written decision submitted within sixty, or, if an exception is granted,
within ninety days. 20 Disputing parties are to make written submis-
sions' 2' and no ex parte communications are allowed." As with
107. Id- para. 6.
108. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
109. Id. art. 13, paras. 1-2.
110. Id. art. 12, para. 7.
111. Id. para. S.
112. Id. para. 9.
113. Id. art. 16, para. 4.
114. Id. art. 17, para. 6.
115. Id. para. 3.
116. Id. para. 10.
117. Id. para. 11.
118. Id. para. 1.
119. Id. para. 9.
120. Id. para. 5.
121. Id. para. 4.
122. Id. para. 1.
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adoption of panel reports, Appellate Body decisions are adopted
without amendment unless the DSB, by consensus, votes otherwise.12-
C. Remedies
There are three possible consequences for Contracting Parties
who are found to be in violation of international trade rules. Initially,
the Contracting Party may be required to conform to the relevant
agreement within a "reasonable period of time."'1 24 This reasonable
period of time is to be proposed first by the Contracting Party in viola-
tion.125 If that Contracting Party's proposal is not approved by the
DSB, both parties to the dispute will attempt to reach an agree-
ment.126 The disputing parties may then enter into binding arbitration
if no agreement is reached. 27 If the Contracting Party fails to comply
within a reasonable period of time, the complaining party may call for
negotiations to determine compensation. 28 Compensation is to be
agreed upon within twenty days of the expiration of the reasonable
period of time. 2 9 If no compensation is agreed upon within this
twenty day period, the complaining party may request that the DSB
authorize retaliation.
30
Retaliation may come in the form of suspending concessions
made by the complainant or suspending other obligations made to the
violating Contracting Party.131 The complainant may suspend conces-
sions or other obligations originating from the same sectors of the
same Covered Agreement violated by the Contracting Party or it may
extend retaliation to a different sector or even to another Covered
Agreement. 32 Where a complaining party requests retaliation, the
respondent has the right to arbitrational review of the appropriateness
of the authorized retaliation.1
3 3
The wide range of possible retaliatory measures allowed by the
DSU gives much needed effect to international trade dispute resolu-
tion. The possibility of measures extending to a Contracting Party's
123. l para. 14.
124. Id. art. 21, para. 3.
125. Id. para. 3(a)-(c).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 22, para. 2.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. I1& para. 3(a)-(b).
132. Ld. para. 3(a)-(c).
133. Id. para. 6.
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activity in a nondisputed agreement means that Contracting Parties
cannot choose which agreements to follow and which to violate. The
DSU provides that retaliatory measures be "practicable or effective"
in resolving disputes.134 Thus, the notion that it might be more advan-
tageous to receive a penalty for violating a given agreement than to
comply with it is unfounded. Under the new system, the penalty im-
posed for violating one agreement could be a suspension from another
agreement, if such a suspension would be more effective.'3 s The heart
of any dispute resolution mechanism is penalties that actually work to
deter future violations. The DSU, by having the Appellate Body de-
termine whether considered retaliatory measures are "practicable or
effective," attempts to do just that.1
36
D. The Future of Dispute Resolution Under the WTO
The WTO's system of dispute resolution is much more legally ori-
ented and rule-based than the system under GATT. The DSU codi-
fies every phase of its dispute resolution mechanism, including
consultation panel formation and decision-making, appellate review,
and remedy implementation. The WTO's heavily judicialized dispute
resolution mechanism is an attempt to increase compliance with WTO
decisions and to reduce delay of decision implementation. In doing
so, the WTO seeks to establish itself as an effective and reliable regu-
lator of international trade.
Ultimately, however, the WTO's ability to effectively resolve dis-
putes in the international arena is limited by the very nature of inter-
national trade. The goals of international trade are to promote a
mutually profitable division of labor, increase the potential real na-
tional product of all nations, and create higher standards of living.
137
It is argued that the best means of achieving these goals is through
free trade.138 As the President's Commission on International Trade
and Investment Policy states, "The ultimate goal [of U.S. trade policy]
should be to achieve for all people the benefit of an open world in
134. Id. para. 3(b)-(c).
135. See Dilon, supra note 10, at 387 (discussing retaliation and cross retaliation proce-
dure under the Dispute Settlement Understanding).
136. Id.
137. For a good discussion on the advantages of international trade, see PAuL A. Svw-
ELSON & WtnL.x D. No.DiAus, EcoNoncs 831-56 (12th ed. 19S5).
138. JAcKSON, supra note 12, at 8.
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which goods and capital can move freely." 139 Attempts to regulate
"free" trade, by definition, cut into the success of accomplishing these
goals, and therefore, should be kept to a minimum if these goals are to
be met.14°
The conflict between the desire for free trade and the need for
regulation is manifest in the competing philosophies of pragmatism
and legalism.' 4 ' GATT's regulatory mechanism, by favoring negotia-
tion and compromise, represents the pragmatist approach to world
trade disputes. 42 The fact that the WTO's mechanism focuses on
rules and deadlines reflects a move within the international law com-
munity towards a more legalist approach. 43 It is believed that inter-
national trading systems profit from increased adherence to
internationally agreed-upon rules, and more effective dispute settle-
ment that defines and seeks to restructure trade among nations. 144
Unfortunately, international trade law can never truly be restruc-
tured because it will always depend on its Contracting Parties' com-
peting economic interests. 45 The WTO, like GATT, will continue to
depend upon the goodwill of the parties to the agreement. 46 Con-
tracting Parties who can afford not to comply, both in the old and new
systems, will continue not to comply. 47 As Thomas J. Dillon notes:
If the party in violation is one of the economically powerful nations,
and, therefore, essential to further effectiveness of the world trading
system, it is unlikely that enforcement against such a party where it
is unwilling will be effective because the enforcement mechanism
relies solely upon cross retaliation in its extreme and might ulti-
mately undermine confidence in the system.148
139. United States International Economic Policy in an Interdependent World, Report to
the President Submitted by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy,
Pr 37.8: In 8/2/Ec 7, 11 (July 1971).
140. SAMUELSON & NomHAus, supra note 137, at 103.
141. Dillon, supra note 10, at 401.
142. Shell, supra note 8, at 833.
143. Id.
144. See Dillon, supra note 10, at 393-98.
145. See id. at 397 ("[O]ften international obligations conflict with national interests,
As a result, an obligation will be discharged only as long as its fulfillment lies within the
national interest.").
146. Id at 398.
147. See Montana i Mora, supra note 33, at 113 ("[T]he basic principle of classical inter-
national law that states cannot be legally bound except with their own consent tends to
make the rules they are obligated to carry out reflective of their interests." Id (citing
Abram Chayes & A.H. Chayes, On Compliance (1992) (draft text of a study on compli-
ance with international treaty obligations)).
148. Dillon, supra note 10, at 398.
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Therefore, the notion that the WTO will revolutionize international
trade has yet to be proven.
V. The WTO Applied: Resolving the Banana Trade War
The workings of the WTO's dispute settlement procedure might
very well be played out over bananas. The international trade com-
munity is watching in anticipation as the banana trade dispute stands
poised to become the first major test of the WTO's ability to resolve
and enforce international disputes. Yet, as the world waits for the
WTO's official dispute resolution process to take place, another mech-
anism of dispute resolution is unfolding: the use of economic and
political power by the United States and European Union to intimi-
date and pressure the international community into resolving the mat-
ter to their advantage.14 9 As a result, the interests of the real players
in the banana dispute-the Latin American, African, Caribbean, and
Pacific nations-have become secondary concerns and may become
completely removed from the ultimate resolution by the time the
WTO panel reaches its official decision.
A. Historical Development of the Banana Dispute
The controversy over bananas began in the years immediately
following World War 1.50 During this period, World War I victors
such as France, Britain, and Italy initiated a policy of preserving trade
preferences for their former colonies and tropical territories in Africa,
the Caribbean, and the Pacific.1 1 These countries are known collec-
tively as the ACP countries.1-  In 1975, nine European countries en-
tered into Lom6 Convention I with forty-six ACP countries.153 Lom6
I, and subsequently Lom6 II through Lome' IV, established special
preference plans for ACP nations.-4 The plans were essentially out-
149. Bananas: Latin Americans to Call for WTO Panel, Etu. REI'., Apr. 27,1996, arail-
able in 1996 WL 8662880.
150. For a history on the development of the banana market, see Jeff Harrington,
Chiquita Becomes U.S. Trade Test Case, CINCINNATI ENQUUIM, Jan. 22,1995, available in
1995 WL 6856685.
151. Id.
152. Douglas E. Matthews, LomW V and ACP/EEC Relations: Surviving the Lost Dec-
ade, 22 CAL. W. IT'L L. 1, 3 (1992). For a discussion of the history and progression of
the Lom Conventions, see id. at 22-53.
153. See generally K.R. Simmonds, The Lomi Convention and the New International
Economic Order, 13 COMION Micr. L. Rnv. 315-34 (1976).
154. The Lomd Conventions are: ACP/EEC Convention of Lom, Feb. 28, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 604 [hereinafter Lom6 I]; Second ACPIEEC Convention of Lom, Oct. 31,1979,19
I.L.M. 327 [hereinafter Lom6 I]; Third ACPJEEC Convention of Lom, Dec. 8, 1934,24
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growths of colonial preferential policies between imperialist powers
and their colonies.' 55 The Conventions were designed "to promote
and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of ACP
States"' 6 and were completed "with a view to [accomplishing] a more
just and balanced international economic order."'
1 57
The preferential treatment given to ACP nations for their banana
market has been crucial to many of these nations' economic well-be-
ing.' Furthermore, without such preferential treatmen't, competition
from Latin American growers might prevent many ACP nations from
playing a central role in the banana market. 159 Latin American ba-
nanas have an advantage over ACP bananas in several important re-
spects. Latin American bananas are grown on large plantations in
Latin America by multinational U.S. corporations such as Dole and
Chiquita. 160 As a result, the cost of production for Latin American
"dollar" bananas 16 is approximately a quarter of the cost of Carib-
bean bananas. 62 Labor and transportation costs are also less expen-
sive in Latin American countries than in the Caribbean. 63 ACP
bananas, on the other hand, are grown by small, independent farmers
and are more than twice as expensive as Latin American bananas.'"
Furthermore, Latin American bananas, because they have the benefit
of distribution by large U.S. companies, are shipped fully ripe.165
ACP bananas tend to be shipped green and undersized, thus adding to
their expense. 66 The difference between Latin American bananas
and ACP bananas is so great that in 1958 Germany refused to sign the
I.L.M. 588 [hereinafter Lom6 III]; and, Fourth ACP/EEC Convention cf Lom6, Dec. 15,
1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 [hereinafter Lom6 IV].
155. See Matthews, supra note 152, at 22-53.
156. Lom6 IV, supra note 154, art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 814.
157. Id.
158. Frances Williams, WTO Ruling 'Could Ruin Poor Banana Economles,' FIN. TiNIEs,
Sept. 10, 1996, at 4.
159. Bananas: Latin Americans to Call for WTO Panel, supra note 149.
160. See Nancy L. Perkins, Introductory Note, F.R.G. v. Council, 34 I.L.M. 154, 157
(introducing Case C-280/93, F.R.G. v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 4980) [hereinafter Perkins].
161. Harrington, supra note 150.
162. Bert Wilkinson, Caribbean Community Writes Clinton Seeking Truce in Banana
Dispute, Associated Press Political Service, June 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5391181.
163. Id.
164. Panama-Commodities: Record Banana Exports for 1994, Inter Prcss Service, Jan. 4,
1995, available in 1995 WL 2257715.
165. Harrington, supra note 150.
166. Id.
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European Economic Community Treaty until it was given the right to
import an adjustable amount of Latin American bananas duty-free1 67
In 1993, a new tariff regime was introduced to provide preferen-
tial treatment of bananas from ACP countries.16S Under the 1993 ba-
nana regime, the European Economic Community (EEC) guarantees
ACP banana producers a thirty percent share of the EEC market. 169
Furthermore, ACP bananas are allowed to enter Europe duty-free un-
til the year 2002,170 whereas non-ACP bananas will be subject to a
tariff quota.171 Those most adversely affected by the EEC's tariff re-
gime are the Latin American nations of Columbia, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Honduras, Panama, Mexico, and El Sal-
vador."7 In 1992, European countries imported over 2.6 million met-
ric tons of bananas from these countries.173 Following the
implementation of the European Community's banana quota, Euro-
pean countries were only allowed to import 2 million metric tons from
Latin American producers, 74 thus creating a major loss of income for
the Latin American nations.
B. Legal Issues
Following the implementation of the 1993 regime, Columbia,
Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Venezuela requested a Panel
to find that the EEC regulation violated GAIT principles. 175 In par-
ticular, the EEC's import regime is inconsistent with the most-fa-
vored-nation clause in Article I, paragraph 1 of GAIT.17" This
provision provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or des-
tined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and uncon-
ditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
167. See Perkins, supra note 160, at 156.
16S. Council Regulation 404193 of 13 February 1993 on the Common Organization of
the Market in Bananas, tit.IV, art. 18, 1993 QJ. (L 47/1) [hereinafter Council Regulation).
169. Id art 19, § 1(b).
170. Id. tit. V, art. 32.
171. Id tit. IV, art. 18, § 1.
172. Debra Percival, Third World-Trade" Rise in EU Banana Quotas Benefits Latin
America, Inter Press Service, Apr. 4, 1995, available in 1995 WIL 2260164 (identifying thas2
nations as the "dollar zone" regions targeted by the EU's single market arrangement for
banana importation).
173. Wilkinson, supra note 162.
174. Council Regulation, supra note 16S, tit. IV, art. 18, § 1.
175. GATr Dispute Settlement Panel Report on the European Economic Community-
Import Regime for Bananas, 34 I.L.M. 177 (1994) [hereinafter Panel Report].
176. Id.
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territories of all other contracting parties." 177 Both the Latin Ameri-
can countries and the ACP countries are Contracting Parties under
GATT. By distinctly privileging ACP produced bananas over Latin
American produced bananas, the EEC import regime appeared to be
incompatible with GAIT.
The EEC claimed that even if its tariff preferences are incompati-
ble with Article I of GAIT, they are justified under Article XXIV. 178
Article XXIV establishes free-trade areas "in which the duties and
other restrictive regulations of commerce... are eliminated on sub-
stantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products
originating in such territories.' 1 79 According to the EEC, the Lom6
Conventions created a free-trade area between the EEC and ACP na-
tions.180 As such, the EEC claimed that the Panel could only examine
specific measures of the Lom6 Convention and not its overall
consistency.'"'
Ultimately, the Panel held that the preferential tariff rates on ba-
nanas accorded by the EEC to ACP nations were inconsistent with
Article I of GATI'. s2 The allocation of import licenses granting ac-
cess to imports under the tariff quota was also held inconsistent with
GATT provisions. 3  Neither the rates nor the licenses were held to
be justified under Article XXIV.'8 While the Panel recommended
that the EEC change its import regime to conform with GATT, it
never definitively concluded that the Lom6 Conventions did not es-
tablish a free-trade area. 85 As the Panel report states: "[N]othing in
[this] report would prevent the parties to the Lom6 Convention from
achieving their treaty objectives, including the objective of promoting
the production and commercialization of bananas from ACP countries
through the use of policy instruments consistent with the General
Agreement.'
'1 86
177. GATT art. I, para. 1.
178. Panel Report, supra note 175, para. 32.
179. GATI art. XXIV, para. 8(b), as amended by Special Protocol Relating to art.
XXIV, Mar. 24, 1948, 62 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Amended GAITI.
180. Panel Report, supra note 175, para. 37.
181. Id. para. 156.
182. Id para. 170(b).
183. Id. para. 170(c).
184. Id. para. 170(b)-(c).
185. See id para. 168.
186. Id.
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C. The Current Situation
The Panel's ambiguous conclusion regarding the creation of a
free-trade area through the Lom6 Conventions allowed the EEC and
ACP nations to obtain a waiver of the Lom6 IV Convention.S 7 Arti-
cle XXV(5) of GATT provides that:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this
Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obliga-
tion imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; provided
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of
the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half
of the contracting parties.188
In December 1994, a waiver was issued to block action against the
Lom6 Convention. s9 Under GAT, such a waiver can be of infinite
duration.190 As a result, the EEC banana import regime currently re-
mains intact.191
It is unclear whether such a waiver would have been issued under
the WTO. Unlike GATT, the WTO Agreement requires a three-
fourths approval rate before a waiver is issued. 92 Furthermore, the
WTO's distinctions from GATT also include Article IX(4), which pro-
vides that waivers are provisional and that any waiver granted for
more than one year must be reviewed annually until the waiver ex-
pires. 93 The review is to examine whether the exceptional conditions
justifying the waiver still exist and whether the waiver is still
required.194
The main justification for issuing a waiver was to encourage the
improvement of ACP nations' economic conditions.19s Such a ration-
ale, however, conflicts with the underlying legalist approach and the
WTO's efforts to codify international trade law. Strict adherence to
187. For a discussion of the waiver, see GATT Approves EU's Waiver for Lom-4 Pact
Until 2000, Reuter European Community Report. Dec. 13,1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allnws File.
188. Amended GATr art. XXV, para. 5.
189. GATT Approves EU's Waiver for Lomg Pact Until 2000, supra note 18".
190. Amended GAIT art. XXV, para. 5.
191. The U.S. Trade Representative's office recently released a statement claiming that
it too will file a complaint with the World Trade Organization against the EU's banana
regime. ADDS Reaction from Costa Rica, Agence France-Presse, Jan. 11, 1996, available
in 1996 WL 3786428.
192. Final Act art. IX, para. 3.
193. Id. para. 4.
194. Id.
195. GATT Approves EU's Waiver for Lomg Pact Until 2000, supra note 187.
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rules is a means of ensuring identical treatment under the law.196 Yet,
it has been noted that this notion of identical treatmen is "misplaced
because not all countries start out on equal footing."'1 97 The fact that
the WTO seeks to establish a more stringent system of rules and com-
pliance with those rules does not eliminate the highly persuasive argu-
ment that different countries must be treated differently.198 It is this
concept of leveling the playing field through unequal treatment that
forms the basis for all development programs.199 As such, this policy
is not likely to disappear soon.
2°°
The creation of a more judicial, legalist regulatory body will not
change the diplomatic nature of international trade law. Thus, the
wa~yer allowing the EEC to, in essence, violate international trade law
would presumably have also been issued under the WTO. In the end,
the rule-intensive WTO system simply creates more hoops through
which developed nations must jump in order to get the same results
they would have obtained under GATIT.
VI. Conclusion
GATT has, at long last, been put to rest as the regulatory body of
international trade law. Its replacement, the WTO, claims to have
learned from GATr's mistakes. Among the many changes imple-
mented by the WTO is the creation of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing. Through the DSU, the WTO attempts to make
international trade law "hard" law.21' That is, under GAIT, interna-
tional trade law was viewed as permissive-to be followed at the discre-
tion of participating Contracting Parties. As such, nations that could
afford noncompliance with dispute resolutions did not comply. By
contrast, under the WTO, DSU decisions are to be implemented ac-
cording to a strict timetable and failure to comply might result in sus-
pension from a wholly different covered agreement. The mandate
196. See Jackson, supra note 45, at 1571-72 and accompanying text (claiming that a
tough GAIT would provide more certainty, predictability, and fairer treatment to all Con-
tracting Parties).
197. EU/ACP: Caribbean and Commission Seek to Protect Lom ftom GATT, EUR.
REP., Oct. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2726984.
198. For a good discussion on development programs and internationl trade principles,
see Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U.
L. REv. 347 (1994).
199. Id at 356-59.
200. See Kel6 Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the
European Union and the United States, 26 ST. MARY'S LJ. 425 (1995) (contending that the
law of trade preferences is now widely practiced in international law).
201. For a definition of "hard" law, see Dupuy, supra note 44, at 42 t-22.
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that retaliatory measures be "practicable or effective"' ' - prevents na-
tions from opting out of compliance with DSU decisions.
Despite these advances, the WTO's efforts to make international
trade law binding will unfortunately remain merely efforts. Ulti-
mately, politics and the need for diplomacy Ail allow powerful Con-
tracting Parties, such as the EEC, to continue violating international
trade law.2"3 The banana dispute provides an excellent example of
how international trade law, even with attempts to make it binding, is
undermined by political maneuvering and notions of diplomacy. The
advantage given to Europe's former colonies came at the expense of
Latin American countries. While both sets of countries are in need of
preferential treatment, it was the ACP nations-those nations bolstered
by the support of the EEC-that "won" the banana trade war.2'A4 The
Panel may have decided in favor of the Latin American countries, but
the reality is a continued system of tariffs and quotas for non-ACP
nations.
202. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22, para. 3.
203. Dillon, supra note 10, at 39S.
204. At the latest meeting of EU agricultural ministers in August N95, the participants
were unable to agree on the size of a quota increase for bananas b.eaue the countries
favoring banana import restrictions wanted to reserve most of the market in the three new
EU Contracting Party countries for ACP nations. Julie Wolf, Why Europe Is Divtdnd by
the Banana Split An International Ron- Is Starting to Ripen, GU XRDLVN, Jan. 10, 193L,
available in 1996 WL 4004141. The three new Contracting Parties-Sweden, Finland, and
Austria-have traditionally bought their bananas from Latin American exporter. Id
1996]

ii i i i ii ! ! li i i! i i ! ,  iil  i ! ii~ ~ !iki 
i ~ii'~ iiii ii iiiii  ~~~~iiiiii,! ! 'i ~~ ~~ii , ,ii ii ~ ~ ~ i! ii iii !~~i~ii~iii~iii i~iA ' !ii i
, ~~ ~~ < \ , i iiI  ii i~ i iii!ii . . !ii!iii!~i!! ,
2<~~i
i~~~i~,
1ro !,or Ru ( f B I Schlesinger I
1909 1)96 i

